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THE"GRAND PRINCE" (Belize v. France).Judgment. iTLOS Case No. 8. At'<http://v.itlos.org/
case documents/2001/documenten_88.pdf>.
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, April 20, 2001.
The Grand Prince, flying the flag of Belize, was arrested on December 26,2000, by a French
surveillance frigate for unlawful fishing in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off the Ker-
guelen islands.' An application for prompt release on bond was filed with the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Tribunal) on March 21, 2001, by the owner's attorney on
behalf of Belize under Article 292 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Conven-
tion).' Addressing the issue proprio motu, on April 20,2001, the Tribunal held that it did not
havejurisdiction, because the applicant failed to establish that Belize vas the flag state." The
Tribunal did not rule on the effect of a French court decision confiscating the vessel.
Following its arrest, the Grand Prince was escorted to the island of Reunion. The master
was charged with fishing without authorization in the EEZ and for failing to give notice of
entry into the EEZ and to declare some twenty tons offish carried on board.4 French records
indicate that the master admitted illegal fishing but disputed the date.' OnJanuary 12,2001,
the tribunal d'instance of Saint-Paul, Reunion, confirmed the arrest of the vessel and condi-
tioned release on payment of a bond of FF 11,400,000.6
On January 23, 2001, the tribunal correctionnel of Saint-Denis, Runion, found the
master guilty of all charges. Taking into account his cooperation with French authorities,
the court sentenced him to a fine of FF 200,000 and awarded FF 20,000 in damages to each
of several civil claimants. His passport was returned. The court also ordered confiscation of
the vessel, the fishing gear, and the seized catch, with immediate execution notwithstanding
appeal (which was pending when the Tribunal decided that it lackedjurisdiction under the
Convention). The effect under French law 'was that title passed to the state.7
On February 19, 2001, the shipowner requested the chiefjudge of the tribunal d'instance
of Saint-Paul to order the prompt release of the vessel as provided for in Article 73 (2) of the
'The masterwas Spanish, and the crew, Spanish and Chilean. The International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea
(Tribunal) summarized the facts in paras. 32-53 of its decision, "Grand Prince" (Belize v. Fr.),Judgment, ITLOS
CaseNo. 8 (Apr. 20, 2001), at<http://iv.itios.org/case-documents/2001/documenLen-88.pdf> [hereinafter
Judgment]. The judgments and other case materials of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea are
available online at the Tribunal's Web site, <http://ivwiv.idos.org>.
2 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, Art. 292, 1833 UNTS 397, reprinted
in 21 ILM 1261 (1982) [hereinafter Convention].
'The vote was 12-9. The majority comprised President Chandrasekhara Rao, Vice-President NelsonJudges
Kolodkin, Park, BamelaEngo, Mensah,Anderson, Wolfrun, Laing (a national ofBelize), Treves, and Ndiaye, and
Judge ad hocCot (chosen by France). In dissent werejudges Caminos, Marotta Rangel, Yankov, Yamamoto, Aid,
Vukas, Marsit, Eiriksson, andJesus. Judgment, supra note 1, para. 95.
4 With respect to the questionable requirement of notification upon entry into the exclusive economic zone,
see case report on the "Camouco" case at 94 AJIL 713, 715 (2000).
5 SeeJudgment, supra note 1, para. 42. During the oral proceedings, however, the applicant stated that the vessel
"had no time to fish because it was caught on the same day it entered the zone." Verbatim Record, Apr. 6, 2001,
Doc. rrLOS/PV/01/3, at 4.
6 FF 6.55957 = e1. In requiring that the bond be posted as cash, certified check, or bank draft, the court
ignored the International Tribunal's determination in "Camouco"and "Monte Confurco"that a bank guarantee is
sufficient. In other respects, however, the court seems to have learned from the Tribunal's rejection of the bond
fixed by the French courts in those cases. It explained its reasons for fixing the bond and referred to both the
Convention and the reasoning of the Tribunal in "Saiga "and "Camouco."Following the Tribunal's lead, the court's
judgment even refers to the requirement that the bond be "raisonnable," although the French text ofArticle 73 (2)
of the Convention is inexplicably aberrant at this point and uses "suffisante." See M/V uSaiga" (St. Vincent v.
Guinea), Prompt Release, rrLoS Case No. 1, para. 82 (Dec. 4, 1997), reported at 92 AJIL 278 (1998); "Camouco"
(Pan. v. Fr.), Prompt Release, 1TLOS Case No. 5 (Feb. 7, 2000), reported at 94 AJIL 713 (2000); "Monte Confurco"
(Seych. v. Fr.), Prompt Release, TLOS Case No. 6 (Dec. 18, 2000), para. 93.
7 SeeJudgment, supra note 1, para. 50.
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Convention upon the payment of a bank guarantee of FF 11,400,000. In his order of Feb-
ruary 22, 2001, the chiefjudge rejected the request in light of the confiscation ordered by
the tribunal correctionnel.
Before the Tribunal, France drew a distinction between a case in which the outcome of
domestic proceedings is still pending and one in which there is ajudgment on the merits.8
It contested jurisdiction and admissibility on the grounds that the confiscation was a deci-
sion on the merits by the French courts beyond the scope of prompt-release proceedings
and rendering them without object,9 and that review of the confiscation decision was subject
to France's reservation to jurisdiction under Convention Article 298(1) (b).' 0
The applicant maintained that the confiscation amounted to a subterfuge orfraud on the
law and was intended to evade the requirement of Convention Article 73(2) that fishing
vessels arrested in the EEZ and their crews "shall be promptly released upon the posting of
reasonable bond or other security." Article 73(2) would become a "dead letter," the appli-
cant warned, if a state could circumvent its release obligation by confiscating the vessel.
The Tribunal did notreach these issues." It observed, "According to settledjurisprudence
in international adjudication, a tribunal must at all times be satisfied that it has jurisdiction
to entertain the case submitted to it. For this purpose, it has the power to examine proprio
motu the basis of its jurisdiction."" Noting that under Article 292(2), the application for
release may be made only by or on behalf of the flag state, and that the applicant has the
initial burden of establishing that it represents the flag state, 3 the Tribunal proceeded to
examine the evidence on this point.
The applicant presented the provisional patent of navigation (registration), which was
issued by the International Merchant Marine Registry of Belize (IMMARBE) on October 16,
2000, and which indicated an expiration date of December 29, 2000; a letter from the attor-
ney general of Belize dated March 15, 2001, which contained the authorization to file an
application to the Tribunal on behalf of Belize and stated that the Grand Prince was regis-
tered in Belize; and an IMMARBE certification, dated March 30, 2001, that despite the expi-
ration of the patent, the vessel was still considered registered in Belize pending the outcome
of the court proceedings. 14 France presented a note verbale datedJanuary 4, 2001, from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belize delivered to the French embassy in El Salvador stating
that, in view of the violation committed by the Grand Prince, itwas being deregistered "effec-
"Verbatim Record, Apr. 5, 2001, Doc. ITLOS/PV/01/2, at 9.
" Article 292(3) provides, in pertinent part, "The court or tribunal shall deal... only with the question of
release, without prejudice to the merits of any case before the appropriate domestic forum against the vessel, its
owner or its crew." France argued, "In the instant case, the Tribunal could not order France promptly to release
the Grand Prince upon the posting of a bond or other guarantee." Observations of the French Government, at 2
(on file with authors). If the Tribunal were to do so, it would "be interfering in the very substance of a penal
proceeding which has been decided by the competent French jurisdiction, which is expressly ruled out by the
provisions of article 292 itself." ld.
" Observations of the French Government, supra note 9, at 3; Verbatim Record, supra note 8, at 15-16. The
French declaration is at<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/conventionagreements/convention-decarations.htm>.
" Severaljudges in the majority commented separately on these issues.Judge Anderson questioned whether
theycould be decided in prompt-release proceedings.Judgment, supranote 1, Sep. Op.Anderson,J.Judge ad hoc
Cot considered that an accusation of fraud was a serious one and that it was notjustified by the facts; expeditious
penal proceedings were not a violation of Article 292, but an application of its spirit, since they help to avoid
undue immobilization of the vessel. Id., Decl. Cot,J. ad hoc paras. 5-7. The late Judge Laing considered that the
confiscation of a vessel, even if valid under national law cannot, per se, be accepted by an international
adjudicatory body if, in intent or effect, it would exclude the jurisdiction of that body or extirpate rights or an
entire remedial scheme. Id., Sep. Op. Laing,J., para. 10.
'Judgment, supra note 1, para.77. The Tribunal cited AppealRelatingto theJurisdiction oftheICAO Council (Ind.v.
PaL), 1972 ICJ REP. 46,52 (Aug. 18), and M/V"Saiga" (No. 2) (St. Vincentv. Guinea),Judgment, ITLOS Case No.
2, para. 40 (July 1, 1999), reported at 94 AJIL 140 (2000).
1
3Judgment, supra note 1, para. 67.
"' Id., paras. 67-70.
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tive today 4January 2001.' In addition, a letter of March 26,2001, sent by MIMARBE to the
honorary consul of France in Belize refers to the decision by the Belizean authorities to sus-
pend the deregistration process since "the owners requested an opportunity to defend them-
selves of the accusations by submitting an appeal to the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea."
16
The Tribunal concluded that the only document issued to the Grand Prince under the
Belizean Registration of Merchant Ships Act of 1989 was the provisional patent of navi-
gation, which expired on December 29, 2000, and was neither extended nor replaced. It
considered the remaining documents on which the applicant relied to be administrative
letters unsupported by any action required by the lawofBelize.17 The IMMARBE communica-
tions indicating that the vessel retained the flag of Belize were expressly "intended to serve
the purpose of authorizing the shipowners to make an 'appeal' to the Tribunal" and "were
issued after the Application was made."" Its certification of March 30 "contains an element
of fiction."19 The note verbale ofJanuary 4, however, "was an official communication from
Belize to France, setting out the legal position of the Government of Belize with respect to
the registration of the vessel."" The Tribunal concluded:
[T]he documents placed before it by the parties disclose on their face contradictions
and inconsistencies in matters relating to expiration of the provisional patent of navi-
gation, de-registration of the vessel and suspension of de-registration, all of which give
rise to reasonable doubt as to the status of the vessel when the Application was made
... [T]he documentary evidence submitted by the Applicant fails to establish that
Belize was the flag State of the vessel when the Application was made. Accordingly, the
Tribunal finds that it has no jurisdiction to hear the Application.2'
The dissenting judges considered that the Tribunal might have exercised its evidence-
gathering powers under Article 77 of its Rules before reaching the conclusion that it did.
They believed that the note verbale ofJanuary 4 indicated only that the Belizean authorities
were in the process of deregistering the vessel; that the evidence before the Tribunal
showed that the competent authorities regarded the Grand Prince as flying the Belizean flag;
and that in any case the statements of the authorities sufficed to discharge the initial burden
of establishing that the vessel had Belizean nationality. They doubted whether deregistration
was a suitable means for implementing the obligation of the flag state effectively to exercise
jurisdiction and control over the ship.22 They also questioned the majority's reliance on the
" Id., para. 72. France did not argue that it relied on the note from Belize or that the note otherwise created
an estoppel. The procis-verbal d'interpelation of'January 11, 2001, states that the vessel was flying the flag of Belize.
The procks-verbaux of seizure prepared by the regional and departmental director of maritime affairs onJanuary
11, probably in light of the January 4 note from Belize, state that the vessel was flying the flag of Belize when
arrested, butwas subsequently deleted from Belizean registry. TheJanuary 23judgment of the criminal court states
that the vessel was flying the flag of Belize.
16Judgment, supra note 1, para. 74.
1
7 Id., paras. 84,86.
" I.Judge Laing (a Belizean national) concluded that the IAMARBE letter and certification were "extra-legal
accommodations being afforded, for whatever they were worth, to the ship owner in its effort to obtain relieffrom
confiscation." Id, Sep. Op. Laing, J., paras. 5-6. Judge Wolfrum took the position that registration cannot be
maintained solely to preserve the right to institute prompt-release proceedings under Article 292. Id., Decl.
Wolfrum,J., para. 3.
19Judgment, supra note 1, para. 85.
"Id, para. 87. Vice-President Nelson was of the view that Foreign Ministry statements of official government
position communicated to another government are binding "or at least must be of high persuasive value." Id.,
Decl. Nelson, V.-P.
"Judgment, supra note 1, paras. 76, 93.
' Id., Diss. Op. Caminos, Marotta Rangel, Yankov, Yamamoto, Aid, Vukas, Marsit, Eiriksson,Jesus,,J., paras. 3,
5, 10, 14, 16.
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nationality of the vessel when the application was made, rather than when the wrong
occurred.23
Article 292 of the Convention was the exclusive source of the Tribunal's jurisdiction in
this case. 4 The article specifies that an application thereunder may be made "only" by or
on behalf of the flag state. The existence of this restriction may have convinced the Tribunal
that it was appropriate to treat the issue as one ofjurisdiction rather than admissibility and,
at least when the documentation before it raised doubts, to address the question ofjuris-
diction proprio motU
26
The dissent observed that the Tribunal's approach in the instant case was a departure
from past practice.27 In "Saiga" the Tribunal overlooked a possible lapse in registration.28
While the issue posed there is similar in some ways, it arose in a different context.29 More-
over, although the opinion does not address the matter, the instant case involved the
reflagging of a fishing vessel, a problem that has attracted international concern.3
Presumably, there were important reasons why the majority chose not to request more infor-
I kL, para. 15.Judge Treves pointed out that in the context of prompt-release proceedings, the wrong is not
the detention, but the breach of the duty to release promptly on reasonable bond. Id., Sep. Op. Treves,J., para.
1. No distinction necessarily arises on the facts of this case between the nationality of the vessel at the time of the
alleged wrong and its nationality at the time of filing the application. Although the Grand Princeivas arrested on
December 26, 2000, the decisions of the French courts on January 12,January 23, and February 22, 2001, were
rendered after the events that cast doubt on the nationality of the ship-namely, the expiration of the provisional
patent (December 29, 2000) and the note from Belize (January 4, 2001). SeegenerallyERICVWYLERLA PGLEDrrE
DE LA coNTnNUrTr DE LA NATIONAIrTE DANS LE CONTENTIEUX INTERNATIONAL (1990).
" Ordinarily, the Convention provides only for compulsory arbitration unless both the applicant and the
respondent have filed declarations accepting thejurisdiction of the International Court ofJustice or the Tribunal,
which was not the case here. Convention, supra note 2, Art. 287. Article 292 permits applications for prompt
release to be made to the Tribunal without regard to these declarations.
See generally GEORGES ABI-SAAB, LES EXCEPTIONS PRtUMINAIRES DANS LA PROCEDURE DE LA COUR INTER-
NATIONALE 206-13 (1967).
" One might note in this context that in U.S. federal courts, diversity of citizenship of the plaintiff and defen-
dantis regarded as a question ofsubject-matterjurisdiction that cannot be %aived. See U.S. CONST.Art. 17/, §2; FED.
R CIV. PRO. 12(h) (3); Capron v. VanNoorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804).
"Judgment, supra note 1, Diss. Op. Caminos et al., J., para. 2. See infra note 29.
M/V "Saiga" (No. 2) (St. Vincentv. Guinea),Judgment, ITLOS Case No. 2, para. 40 (July 1, 1999).
- In the cases involving the M/V Saiga-the first two for the Tribunal-it did not question nationality proprio
motu either in the prompt-release proceedings or in connection with the subsequent request for provisional
measures. M/V"Saiga" (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Prompt Release, ITLOS Case No. 1, para. 82 (Dec. 4,1997); M/V
"Saiga" (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Provisional Measures (Order), ITLOS Case No. 2 (Mar. 11, 1998). The
question of a lapse in registration was not raised by the respondent until it objected to admissibility during the
second stage of the second case arising out of the same incident; at that stage the Tribunal hadjurisdiction over
the merits predicated on a special agreement, including challenges to the legality both of the arrest and of the
use of force resulting in personal injury. M/V"Saiga" (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea),Judgment, ITLOS Case No.
2, para. 40 (July 1,1999), paras. 44-54. St. Vincent and the Grenadines maintained at all times that it-was the flag
state, and issued a permanent certificate of registration two months after the expiration of the provisional
certificate. Id., paras. 67-74. That did not occur in the instant case: the owner was planning to reflag the vessel in
Brazil at the time it was arrested, and the authorities stated that they were awaiting the outcome of the case to
decide on deregistration.Judgment, supra note 1, paras. 33,70,74.
' The Agreement to Promote Compliance vith International Conservation and Management Measures by
FishingVessels on the High Seas, Nov. 23,1993, inFOODANDAGRICULTURE ORGANIZATIONAND DIVISIONOFOCEAN
AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL FIsHERIES INsrRUNENTrs WITH INDEX 41, UN
Sales No. E.98.V.11 (1998), states in its preamble:
[Tlhe practice of flagging or reflagging fishing vessels as a means of avoiding compliance with international
conservation and management measures for living marine resources, and the failure of flag States to fulfil
their responsibilities with respect to fishing vessels entitled to fly their flag, are among the factors that
seriously undermine the effectiveness of such measures.
See also id., Art. 3. At the time of the case, this agreement had been accepted by the European Union but not
Belize, and was not yet in force. See<http://wvv.fao.org/Legal/defaulLhtm> (visited Sept. 21, 2001).
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mation from Belize.3 A clue may be found in the dissent, which expressed regret that the
majority's decision prevented the Tribunal from considering significant issues,3 2 presumably
those regarding the confiscation order.
France had a right under Convention Article 73 (1) to impose penalties for violation of its
fisheries laws in the EEZ, and Article 73(3) expressly excludes only imprisonment and cor-
poral punishment. France also had a duty under Article 73 (2) to release the vessel promptly
on reasonable bond. Even if the Article 73 (1) right permits confiscation, 3 or if its exercise
is not subject to review in prompt-release proceedings or otherwise, the question is whether
confiscation may nullify the Article 73 (2) duty. The answer requires interpretation of Article
73(2), read alone and in the context of both Article 73 as a whole and other provisions,
including Article 300, which requires good faith fulfillment of obligations and prohibits
abuse of right.
34
A good faith confiscation (or ajudicial preference for presuming good faith) does not
end the difficulty. Is there an option of rapid confiscation that renders effectively mean-
ingless the obligation to release the ship promptly under the Convention? Would an affir-
mative response encourage a rush tojudgment in criminal proceedings that poses a risk of
human rights violations? Or encourage a rush to the Tribunal that would afford municipal
courts less opportunity to consider the question of release on bond? If a change of flag or
deregistration may be a mere formality once title is assumed by the state, and if the state in-
stituting Article 292 proceedings must be the flag state at the time of application," would
that rule out such proceedings or merely reopen the underlying inquiry in another form?
How much, if anything, is lost if the penalty is the value of the ship (or more) rather than
the ship itself? The coastal state is free to establish monetary penalties reasonably calculated
to deter violations, and also to establish criteria to guide precise calibration of penalties by
its courts. In previous cases, the Tribunal indicated that both the potential penalties and the
value of the vessel may be taken'into account in determining the reasonableness of the
bond.36 In this context, the question of the intent of Article 73 might be posed starkly as
"Judge Anderson observed that the applicant's agent was "not well placed, as a non-Belizean lawyer in private
practice in Spain, to explain to theTribunal the seeming inconsistencies in the statements ofdifferent government
departments and agencies in Belize."Judgment, supra note 1, Sep. Op. Anderson,J., at 1. While acknowledging
the special nature of prompt-release proceedingsJudge ad hoc Cot worried about the designation of a private
attorney as agent; the Tribunal needs to have reliable information on the legal position of the flag state. He also
questioned the incentives of private lawyers. Id., Dec1. CotJ. ad hoc, paras. 13-14. These observations seem to
assume the traditional posture of the state as applicant. In prompt-release proceedings, however, the application
may be brought "on behalf of" rather than "by" the flag state, rendering the state (if it wishes) only the nominal
party. SeeBernard H. Oxman, Book Review, 95 AJIL 731, 733-34 (2001); Bernard H. Oxman, Observations on Iessel
Release Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 11 INT'LJ. MARINE & COAsrAL L 201, 211 (1996).
The question of private attorneys has arisen in other contexts. Saint Lucia was allowed to be represented by private
advisers in oral hearings before the WTO Appellate Body, seeEuropean Communities-Regimeforthernportation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc. Wr/DS27/AB/R, paras. 10-12 (Sept. 9, 1997), but the panel below had
refused to do so, notably on the ground that the common use of private attorneys would put an economic burden
on developing countries, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO
Doc. WT/DS27/R/USA, paras. 7.10-.12 (May 22, 1997).
'Judgment, supra note 1, Diss. Op. Caminos et al.,JJ., para. 17.
s AsJudge Anderson noted:
The [Food and Agricultural Organization's] publication entitled "Coastal State Requirements for Foreign
Fishing" (FAO Legislative Study 21, Rev. 4) states (section 5) that: "In addition to fines, the vast majority of
countries empower their courts to order forfeiture of catch, fishing gear and boats. In a few cases, forfeiture
of vessels is automatic, even on the first offence." The accompanying Table E, headed "Penalties for
unauthorized foreign fishing," lists over 100 jurisdictions, most of them States Parties to the Convention,
which provide for forfeiture of the vessel used in unauthorized fishing activities.
Id., Sep. Op. Anderson,J., at 4 n.3. The most recent revision of the FAO document (Rev. 5; 1996) is available
online at <http://iv'.fao.org/docrep/V9982E/,9982e0O.htm>.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
"Camouco" (Pan. v. Fr.), Prompt Release, ITLOS Case No. 5, para. 67 (Feb. 7, 2000); "Monte Confurco"
(Seych. v. Fr.), Prompt Release, rrLOS Case No. 6, para. 76 (Dec. 18, 2000).
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follows: were the negotiators of the Convention-and the countless lawyers who reviewed
it-sophisticated realists who understood that the duty to release promptly on reasonable
bond might in practice mean limiting the penalty to the cash guaranteed by a bond whose
reasonableness might be reviewed by a standing international tribunal unlikely to be hostile
to coastal state interests?
Indeed, the Convention specifies that only monetary penalties may be imposed in most
cases for pollution violations by foreign ships.'7 The underlying questions posed by the
French confiscation are not irrelevant, however. For one thing, the limitation to monetary
penalties does not apply "in the case of a wilful and serious act of pollution in the territorial
sea." s For another, if civil proceedings 9 joined to, or emanating from, a criminal or
administrative proceeding prolong the detention, the kind of problem posed by the French
confiscation in the instant case might arise again, albeit in a different, more complex, and
potentially more serious context. The detention of a merchant ship affects not only the
particular interests of its owner and flag state, but the broader interests of many states in
navigation rights and the free movement of their exports and imports as implicated by the
duty under Article 226 (1) (b) to promptly release ships detained for pollution violations on
the posting of reasonable bond.
One way to pose the question is whether the domestic decision not to release the vessel-
even as a consequence of ajudgment of confiscation-should be regarded as severable or
as merged into the judgment on the merits." If it is merged into the merits, and if Article
292 is regarded as inapplicable for that reason, then review by an international tribunal is
compulsory under the Convention only in accordance with its general dispute settlement
provisions, including Article 298(1) (b), which gives states the right to declare that they
exclude disputes relating to the exercise of their fisheries-enforcement rights in the EEZ.
France and a number of other states have made such declarations."
Although France has now appeared three times as a respondent in prompt-release cases
involving fisheries arrests off its Southern and Antarctic Terrritoies,4 2 this case is the first
in which France invoked its declaration under Article 298 (1) (b). It did so subtly, however.
Consistent with its approach in the earlier cases, France did not assert that its declaration
precludes a proceeding underArticle 292 to review compliance with its prompt-release obli-
gation under Article 73 (2)."s It claimed, instead, that its declaration excludes jurisdiction
with respect to a dispute concerning the enforcement of its sovereign rights over living re-
sources of the EEZ pursuant to Article 73 (1), and thus precludes review of "a wide dispute"
concerning its right to confiscate the fishing vessel as a penalty.' This argument parallels
its position that the confiscation was a judgment on the merits that was excluded from
Article 292 proceedings and that, in any event, rendered them without object.
s Convention, supra note 2, Art. 230(1). But see infra note 38.
alConvention, supra note 2, Art. 230(2).
3' "Nothing in this Convention affects the institution of civil proceedings in respect of any claim for loss or
damage resulting from pollution of the marine environment" Id., Art. 229.
40 Presumably, failure to demand prompt release at some point may constitute a waiver of the right or of the
Article 292 remedy. The "Camouco"case did not address the legal issues that such delay might pose where there
has been a final judgment. See "Camouco,"paras. 51-54.
"' There is no comparable right to exclude jurisdiction with respect to arrests of foreign ships for pollution
violations.
4
2 See"Camouco," Prompt Release; "Monte Confurco," Prompt Release.
43Those arguing thatsuch a declaration may precludejurisdiction in prompt-release proceedings would likely
argue that the failure to release is itself an exercise of enforcement powers. Those arguing that it does not might
point out that Article 73 expressly excludes from coastal state enforcement rights the power to refuse to release
promptly on reasonable bond, and that Article 292, apart from the fact that it nowhere uses the word "dispute,"
exceptionally grants compulsoryjurisdiction to the Tribunal to enforce the duty of prompt release and, in doing
so, distinguishes the question of prompt release on reasonable bond from disputes regarding the legality of the
arrest or prosecution.
11 SeeJudgment, supra note 1, para. 60; Verbatim Record, supra note 8, at 15-16.
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To those judges who believed that resolution of the important issues raised by the con-
fiscation order might best be deferred, the Tribunal's decision to deal strictly with an ap-
plicant that failed to get its formal documentation in order may have seemed not only the
easiest, but the most prudent, approach.45
BERNARD H. OX.AN AND VINCENT P. BANTz
University of Miami School of Law
European Community--subsidies-ftee movement ofgoods--economic incentivesfor renewable energy-
UN Convention on Climate Change
PREUSSENELEKTRA AG v. SCHLESWAG AG. Case C-379/98. At <http://wv.curia.eu.int/en/
index.hun>.
Court ofJustice of the European Communities, March 13, 2001.
A German court of first instance (the Landgericht Kiel) requested the European Court
ofJusdcel (ECJ) to decide whether Section 4(1) of the German law on the public electricity
grid (Electricity Law) 2 was compatible with Article 28 (previously Article 30) of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty)3 concerning the free movement of
goods, andArticle 87 (previouslyArticle 92) of the EC Treaty concerning subsidies.4 Section
4(1) of the Electricity Law obligates German electricity suppliers both to buy the electricity
that is generated exclusively by renewable energy sources within their areas5 and to pay the
(private) providers a fixed minimum price. Under prevailing market conditions, this price
is considerably higher than that paid for any type of energy generated from nonrenewable
sources.6 The additional costs are borne by the suppliers and passed on to upstream network
operators/providers if the energy thus purchased exceeds 5 percent of the energy supplied
by the former to end users.
'-A discussion in the context of U.S. constitutional adjudication of "the techniques for not deciding, when a
decision would be improvident for the nation," as Harry Wellington puts it in his foreword (at p. x), can be found
in chapter 4, "The Passive Virtues," of Alexander M. Bickel's celebrated book, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
111-98 (2d ed. 1986).
In a procedure under Article 234 (previously 177) of the TREATYESTABUiSHING THE EUROPEAN COM.T1UNrY,
Mar. 25, 1957,298 UNTS 11, as amended by TREATY OF AMsTERDAM, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, reprinted in
37 ILM 56 (1998) (hereinafter EC Treaty].
2 Gesetz fiber die Einspeisung von Strom aus emeuerbaren Energien in das 6ffentliche Netz (Stromein-
speisungsgesetz, StrEG) [Law on feeding electricity from renewable energy sources into the public grid], v.
7.12.1990 (BGBI. I S.2633), as amended by Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Energiewirtschaftsrechts (New law for the
energy industry], v. 24.4.1998 (BGBI. I S.730).
5 EC Treaty, supra note 1, Arts. 28, 87 (previously Arts. 30, 92).
'Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra AG v. Schlesiwag AG (Mar. 13,2001). See the Web site of the Court of Justice
of the European Communities (ECJ), <http://www.curia.eu.int/en/index.htn>, forits recentjudgments and the
opinions of the advocate general. Article 28 provides: "Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures
having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between the Member States." Article 87(1) provides:
Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in
any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or
the production ofcertain goods shall, insofaras itaffects trade between Member States, be incompatible xith
the common market.
Although we refer to articles of the EC Treaty as currently numbered, in the instant case the ECJ and also, on
occasion, the advocate general use the previous numbers.
'Certain limits apply. Renewable energy sources, as listed in Sectionl of the amended Electricity Law, include:
hydraulic, wind, and solar energy; gas from waste dumps and seage treatment plants; and biomass.
6 This regime has since been superseded by the Cesetz fu-r den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien (Ereuerbare-
Energien-Gesetz, EEG), v. 29.3.2000 (BGBI. I S. 305), which sets up (Section 3) a purchase-obligation system sim-
ilar to the Electricity Law, but provides (Section 11) for a compensation rule on the national level pertaining to
all network operators. The same issues are raised.
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